Objective: Cancer causes death to millions of people worldwide. Early detection of cancer in primary care may enhance patients' chances of survival. However, physicians often miss early cancers, which tend to present with undifferentiated symptoms. Within a theoretical framework of the hypothesis generation (HyGene) model, together with psychological literature, we studied how 2 factors-cancer prevalence and an alternative explanation for the patient's symptoms-impede early cancer detection, as well as prompt patient management. Method: Three hundred family physicians diagnosed and managed 2 patient cases, where cancer was a possible diagnosis (one colorectal cancer, the other lung cancer). We employed a 2 (cancer prevalence: low vs. high) ϫ 2 (alternative explanation: present vs. absent) between-subjects design. Cancer prevalence was manipulated by changing either patient age or sex; the alternative explanation for the symptoms was manipulated by adding or removing a relevant clinical history. Each patient consulted twice. Results: In a series of random-intercept logistic models, both higher prevalence (OR ϭ 1.92, 95% confidence interval [CI 1.27, 2.92]) and absence of an alternative explanation (OR ϭ 1.70, 95% CI [1.11, 2.59]) increased the likelihood of a cancer diagnosis, which, in turn, increased the likelihood of prompt referral (OR ϭ 22.84, 95% CI [16.14, 32.32]). Conclusions: These findings confirm the probabilistic nature of the diagnosis generation process and validate the application of the HyGene model to early cancer detection. Increasing the salience of cancer-such as listing cancer as a diagnostic possibility-during the initial hypothesis generation phase may improve early cancer detection.
primacy effects (Chapman, Bergus, & Elstein, 1996; Rebitschek, Bocklisch, Scholz, Krems, & Jahn, 2015) . Research has therefore strongly indicated that having an appropriate hypothesis-which could be determined by the initial cues perceived and which determines subsequent information search and interpretationplays a crucial role in the diagnostic process.
Accounts from the clinical reasoning literature have discussed hypothesis generation as matching of the presenting problem to a similar problem previously encountered (Norman & Brooks, 1997) , abstraction from specific patient features to higher order memory structures (Grant & Marsden, 1987) , and mapping specific patient cases to disease prototypes (Charlin, Tardif, & Boshuizen, 2000) . For a review, see Kostopoulou (2009) . Accounts from the psychological literature have discussed hypothesis generation as the employment of preconscious heuristic processes, which form the most plausible epistemic mental models of the world (J. S. B. T. Evans, 2006 Evans, , 2008 ; J. S. B. T. Evans, Venn, & Feeney, 2002) . These accounts differ in the knowledge or memory structures that they posit but are similar in that they underspecify the hypothesis generation process.
In contrast to previous theoretical accounts, the hypothesis generation (HyGene) model is a computational process model of hypothesis generation that attempts to specify this process more precisely (e.g., Thomas, Dougherty, & Buttaccio, 2014; Thomas, Dougherty, Sprenger, & Harbison, 2008) . The model assumes three basic cognitive processes: (a) retrieval from memory, (b) maintenance in working memory, and (c) judgment and decisionmaking. Specifically, the patients' presented symptoms activate traces in episodic memory, representing similar past cases. An "unspecified probe" extracts the hypotheses (diagnoses) that are most frequently and strongly associated with the symptoms and matches them against known hypotheses (e.g., prototypes of diseases stored in semantic memory). Hence, the better the match between cancer prototype and the patients' symptoms, the more likely it is that the cancer hypothesis will reach the minimum activation threshold to enter working memory. This is an iterative process, so once an additional hypothesis is sufficiently activated by the probe (i.e., achieves the dynamically updated minimum activation threshold), it, too, enters working memory. However, due to memory constraints, physicians would keep only a limited number of hypotheses in their working memory; these would then guide subsequent information search and hypothesis testing. A process comparing the relative strengths of the competing hypotheses in working memory determines the posterior probability of the hypotheses. A hypothesis-guided search starts and proceeds if more than one hypothesis is tested. The model assumes a consistency check of the hypothesis with the input data: A hypothesis is rejected if it is not consistent with the symptoms.
Several factors may affect the generation of cancer hypotheses (e.g., time constraints and working memory constraints), but two factors are especially likely to determine the degree of a match between patient symptoms and the cancer hypothesis and therefore its strength of activation and maintenance in working memory: the a priori probability of cancer and the presence of another explanation (e.g., a more common disease that also matches the patients' symptoms). First, physicians perceiving a low probability of cancer in patients presenting with vague symptoms may fail to generate the cancer hypothesis or exclude it as an implausible explanation for the patients' symptoms in the hypothesis evaluation phase. Indeed, people tend to generate the hypotheses with a high a priori probability first (Dougherty & Hunter, 2003a; Weber, Böckenholt, Hilton, & Wallace, 1993) . Physicians may also fail to diagnose cancer if there is an alternative, more common, explanation for the symptoms. This might impair the hypothesis generation process (i.e., the cancer diagnosis does not reach the dynamically updated activation threshold; Gettys & Fisher, 1979) and/or the hypothesis evaluation process (i.e., the relative strength, and hence the posterior probability, of the cancer hypothesis is weakened due to a stronger plausible alternative; Dougherty & Hunter, 2003a; Windschitl & Wells, 1998) .
Present Research
In the experiment presented here, we tested the effect of prevalence and an alternative explanation on the diagnosis and subsequent management of early cancers. We constructed two patient cases that depicted common cancers: one colorectal and the other lung. Colorectal and lung cancers are two of the commonest cancers (Maddams, Utley, & Møller, 2012) and are often missed in their early stages of presentation (Rubin, McPhail, & Elliott, 2011) . We avoided well-known methodological pitfalls. First, we manipulated the two factors using a factorial design, while keeping confounding variables such as disease severity constant. Second, we designed the clinical vignettes and manipulated the study factors in an ecologically valid way: (a) we manipulated patient characteristics to alter disease prevalence rather than provide descriptive base rates and (b) we either provided or withheld a medical history that could offer a plausible alternative explanation for the patients' symptoms. Finally, to overcome possible pitfalls of novice-expert differences (e.g., Shanteau, 1992) , we recruited practicing physicians, rather than medical students, as study participants. We employed an experimental vignette study because it offers high internal and external validity of clinical judgments (S. C. Evans et al., 2015; Rose et al., 2015) .
We tested three hypotheses. First, we hypothesized that a set of symptoms in patients with a higher prevalence of cancer will lead physicians to diagnose cancer more often than in patients with a lower prevalence (Hypothesis 1). Second, we hypothesized that a set of symptoms in patients with a prior, alternative (i.e., noncancerous) explanation of their symptoms will lead physicians to diagnose cancer less often than when an alternative explanation is not available (Hypothesis 2). Finally, as has been shown in previous research (e.g., Kostopoulou et al., 2008) , we expected that diagnostic decisions would affect management decisions (Hypothesis 3).
Method Participants
We determined our sample size in two steps. First, we defined the sample size stopping rule based on the a priori power analysis using G ‫ء‬ Power (Cohen, 1988; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) . We required a minimum sample size of 237 participants for a logistic regression model with a binary predictor and adjusted for a covariate accounting for an additional 20% in order to detect an Odds ratio of 2.3 with 80% power at a 5% significance level. Such an effect size was assumed in other studies that used hypothetical vignettes to study the effect of patient demographics on diagnostic This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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accuracy (e.g., Eva, Link, Lutfey, & McKinlay, 2010) . Second, we increased the computed sample size by around 25% (i.e., n ϭ 297) to account for the number of participants who would refer at least one patient on the first visit. We invited, by e-mail, fully certified and currently practicing family physicians who had participated in previous studies conducted by the second author. We also received help with recruitment from clinical research networks around the United Kingdom, who contacted primary care clinics on our behalf. Potential participants were told that they would be taking part in a study of clinical reasoning. Cancer was not mentioned in the study information. After completing the study, each respondent was asked to provide an e-mail address in order to receive a £20 (around US $32) electronic Amazon voucher. To ensure that participants were actually physicians, and that each participant completed the study only once, we asked them to provide their professional National Health Service e-mail address. Participants' e-mail addresses were not linked to their data.
We recorded 382 attempts to complete the questionnaire. Only participants who completed all the vignettes were entered into the analysis. We excluded 82 incomplete attempts, most of which explored only the first presented vignette. As a result, 300 family physicians completed the questionnaire. Half of the sample (50.7%) were male, and 36% of participants were practicing in an inner city, 45.7% in an urban area and 18.3% in a rural area. Experience in family medicine postcertification ranged from 0 to 40 years (M ϭ 10.7, SD ϭ 9.2 years, Mdn ϭ 7).
Design and Materials
We employed a 2 (cancer prevalence: low vs. high) ϫ 2 (alternative explanation: present vs. absent) between-subjects experimental design for both patient cases (colorectal cancer and lung cancer), respectively. Each patient consulted twice. We therefore constructed two vignettes per case, i.e., one per consultation. We constructed the vignettes with the help of two experienced family physicians (the last two coauthors), who systematically reviewed the clinical literature on predictive symptoms and signs of colorectal and lung cancers. Participants saw both vignettes per case, unless they decided to refer the patient at the first consultation. In the colorectal cancer case, we manipulated cancer prevalence by changing the patient's age (40 vs. 70 years for low vs. high prevalence, respectively) to reflect increasing incidence with age (e.g., the increased incidence for U.K. men over 50 years of age; Cancer Research UK, 2012a). In the lung cancer case, we manipulated cancer prevalence by changing the patient's sex to reflect the past trend of higher prevalence of lung cancer in men versus women (e.g., age-standardized incidence rates in the United Kingdom are higher for men [95.7 per 100,000] compared with women [66.5 per 100,000]; Cancer Research UK, 2012b). The alternative explanation in the colorectal cancer case was hemorrhoids; in the lung cancer case, it was infective exacerbation of preexisting chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. The alternative explanation was either present or absent. Thus, we created four vignette versions per consultation and patient case (the complete set of vignettes and their versions is presented in the online supplemental materials).
Second consultation vignettes always followed first consultation vignettes. At the first consultation, participants were randomized to either the colorectal or the lung cancer case. They saw and responded to the first consultations of both cancer cases. At the second consultation, they were randomized again to either the colorectal or the lung cancer case. Between these second consultations they saw a single-consultation vignette, which was not about cancer (a child presenting with an ear infection). This served as a decoy, to minimize any suggestion that the study was about cancer, and was also used to test a different hypothesis, not related to this study. No data from the decoy case are presented here.
Each case included basic information about the patient (name, sex, age, smoking status, last recorded blood pressure, relevant past medical history, current medications, and the reason for the last consultation), the current health complaint, current symptoms, and the results of relevant physical examinations and investigations. At the second consultation, the patients were still suffering from the same or slightly worsened symptoms and they had some new symptoms; specifically, the colorectal cancer patient presented with two "alarm" symptoms (blood in stool and slightly reduced hemoglobin, indicating possible anemia and therefore blood loss), whereas the lung cancer patient presented with additional vague symptoms (fatigue, loss of appetite), which are not cancer-specific.
Procedure
Once participants had accessed the study site and read some information about the study, they were asked to provide sociodemographic details: gender, number of years in family medicine, and location of their practice (inner city, urban, or rural). They then read a vignette about the first consultation of the first patient (either colorectal or lung cancer). At the end of the vignette, they confirmed that they had read it, before proceeding to the diagnosis and management page. First, they were asked to enter their main diagnosis by answering this question: "What is your working diagnosis? (Please enter only one)." They could also enter any other diagnoses that they were considering (see the online supplementary materials). They were then asked to select one or more from the following list of management options: arrange follow-up, order investigations, prescribe, and refer to secondary care. Some of these options could be specified further. For example, the option refer to secondary care required a reason for referral, the type of specialist, and the type of referral: emergency (within 24 hr), urgent (within 2 weeks, as recommended for suspected cancer), or routine (typically 4 -8 weeks). The management options fully respected the U.K. health care system to make the diagnostic and management task as realistic as possible. The guidelines for urgent referral for suspected cancer are laid down by the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (2015) . At the end of the study, participants entered their e-mail address in order to receive the Amazon voucher.
We created two diagnostic variables: (a) cancer as the main diagnosis (i.e., whether cancer was the main diagnosis or not) and (b) cancer as the diagnosis (i.e., whether cancer was recorded at all, either as the main diagnosis or as one of the other diagnoses considered; in other words, the "differential"). The first author coded whether participants provided a cancer diagnosis or not for both diagnostic variables on each occasion. One of the physician coauthors coded whether the management decisions were likely to lead to early, delayed, or nil detection of cancer (e.g., a decision This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
not to refer was coded as not leading to cancer detection; a decision to refer to the wrong specialty was coded as leading to delayed cancer detection). The other physician coauthor coded the management decisions on a subset of responses (n ϭ 657; 57.6%).
Interrater agreement was very high, at 98% (Cohen's ϭ .96, SE ϭ .03), and the few disagreements were resolved in the discussion. We recoded the management decisions in two ways: one as early cancer management (early cancer referral vs. late or no cancer referral) and one as cancer management (any cancer referral vs. no cancer referral). We conducted the study in accordance with the ethical standards of the American Psychological Association and obtained ethical approval from the Proportionate Review Subcommittee of West London (REC 2).
Results
In total, the physicians considered cancer 70.2% of the time (800 out of 1,140 responses), although cancer was their main working diagnosis only 23.3% of the time (266 out of 1,140 responses). They did not refer for cancer at all 65.7% of the time, referred for cancer routinely 10.6% of the time, and urgently 23.7% of the time. Thus, although most responses included cancer as a diagnostic possibility, they did not always include a referral decision. The physicians recorded cancer as their main diagnosis more frequently in the colorectal cancer case than in the lung cancer case and at the second rather than the first consultation (see Figure 1 , Panel A). A similar pattern was seen in the urgent cancer referrals (see Figure 1 , Panel C). In relation to our manipulated factors, the physicians recorded cancer as their main diagnosis more often in the vignettes where cancer prevalence was high (vs. low) and in the vignettes where there was no prior alternative explanation for the symptoms (vs. an alternative explanation; see Figure 1 , Panel B). Again, diagnostic rates were reflected in the urgent referral rates (see Figure 1, Panel B) .
We measured the influence of cancer prevalence (Hypothesis 1) and an alternative explanation (Hypothesis 2) on diagnosis, using generalized estimating equations (GEEs)-logistic regression with random intercept and with vignette sequence as a repeated measure. In a model without covariates (see Table 1 , left, unadjusted model column), higher cancer prevalence and absence of an alternative explanation almost doubled the frequency of cancer as the main diagnosis. There were no significant interactions between the two factors. In a model adjusted for covariates (see Table 1 , left, adjusted model column), consultation (first vs. second) and physician experience (years in family medicine) produced similar results: Higher prevalence and absence of an alternative explanation increased cancer diagnosis, without a significant interaction. The odds of a cancer diagnosis were over four times higher at the This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
second than at the first consultation. More experienced family physicians diagnosed cancer slightly more often than less experienced physicians. When we repeated these analyses for the more inclusive measure of diagnosis (cancer given as either the main diagnosis or in the differential; see Table 1 , right column), only prevalence remained significant. In terms of the covariates (see Table 1 , right column), consultation decreased and physician experience increased the odds of diagnosing cancer. Therefore, when consultation and physician experience were accounted for in the model, higher cancer prevalence increased the odds of giving cancer either as the main diagnosis or in the differential; lack of an alternative explanation increased only the odds of giving cancer as the main diagnosis. Such evidence provides support for the two hypotheses derived from the HyGene model about the effect of prevalence (Hypothesis 1) and an alternative explanation (Hypothesis 2) on cancer diagnosis. We had expected that, if cancer were the participants' main diagnosis, this would lead to referral (Hypothesis 3). Indeed, a series of GEE logistic regression models with random intercept, whether unadjusted or adjusted for consultation and physician experience, confirmed this expectation (see Table 2 ). Giving cancer as the main diagnosis increased the odds of any cancer referral (vs. no referral) around 13 times in both unadjusted and adjusted models, and the odds of early cancer referral (vs. delayed or no referral) almost 23 times in the unadjusted model and 20 in the adjusted model. A second consultation also increased the odds of This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
both referral (vs. no referral) and urgent referral (vs. delayed or no referral), on average, by a factor of 5. Physician experience was not related to referral decisions (see Table 2 ). Thus, Hypothesis 3 was also confirmed: Having cancer as the main diagnosis led to a higher rate of referrals.
Discussion
The goal of this study was to investigate two possible determinants of the prompt detection and management of early cancers by family physicians: disease prevalence and the availability of a prior, alternative explanation. Specifically, higher prevalence and no alternative explanation for the symptoms increased the frequency of cancer diagnoses and referrals to secondary care. In addition, we found that physicians gave cancer as their main working diagnosis and referred the patient urgently (i.e., within 2 weeks) much more often with repeated presentations that suggested a worsening of the condition and more often for the colorectal cancer case, which included "alarm" symptoms, than for the lung cancer case, which included only vague symptoms.
Physicians' sensitivity to prevalence is consistent with the HyGene model and the literature in the field (Dougherty & Hunter, 2003a; Thomas et al., 2008; Weber et al., 1993 ). It appears to contrast with the literature on base-rate neglect. According to this, people, including physicians, neglect prevalence information (e.g., Elstein & Schwartz, 2000; Hamm, 1996; Hoffrage & Gigerenzer, 1998; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; McNair & Feeney, 2015; Sirota, Juanchich, & Hagmayer, 2014; Sirota, Kostovičová, & Vallée-Tourangeau, 2015) . For instance, only five out of 48 physicians integrated the disease base-rate information with the results of cancer screening when asked about its positive predictive value (Hoffrage & Gigerenzer, 1998) . However, we wish to argue that this is only a superficial contradiction, because the different contexts (screening vs. diagnosing) require different knowledge and engage different cognitive processes. Neglecting the base-rate information seems to be limited to specific cognitive paradigms (e.g., textbook tasks) that require people to compute the probabilities explicitly and provide the statistical information from description, not from experience (Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004; Sirota, Vallée-Tourangeau, Vallée-Tourangeau, & Juanchich, 2015) . In fact, some authors would argue that people, including physicians, are sensitive to the base-rate information and integrate it successfully with other pieces of information once they have experienced it (Christensen-Szalanski & Beach, 1982; Gill, Sabin, & Schmid, 2005) . In our study, we provided qualitative evidence of the updating that is based on experience.
The effect of an alternative explanation fits well with the HyGene model (Thomas et al., 2008 (Thomas et al., , 2014 . The immediate availability of an alternative explanation creates a stronger link between the relevant diagnostic hypothesis and the observed symptoms and enables it to reach the activation threshold for entering working memory. This would also fit well with the general cognitive tendency of people to focus too narrowly on the hypothesis currently under consideration, while ignoring other relevant hypotheses. People tend to neglect relevant alternative explanations (Fernbach, Darlow, & Sloman, 2010) , favor information supporting the focal hypothesis (Doherty, Chadwick, Garavan, Barr, & Mynatt, 1996) , engage in a search strategy that confirms their initial hypothesis (Klayman & Ha, 1987) , and construct one mental model of a diagnostic problem at a time and then focus on it (the "singularity principle"; J. S. B. T. Evans, 2006) . Future research should test the specific psychological mechanisms of hypothesis activation and maintenance in medical diagnosis, using more realworld study designs, for example, where physicians are allowed to gather information as they see fit, rather than being provided with information all at once or in a predetermined sequence. Physician experience increased the frequency of cancer provided as the main working diagnosis. This is, however, in direct contrast with the findings of a recent study (Kostopoulou, Sirota, et al., 2017) , where family physicians diagnosed richer and more realistic cancer scenarios than the vignettes used in this study: More experienced physicians were significantly less likely to consider cancer as a possibility at the start of the clinical consultation and to give it later as their main, working diagnosis. In this and the current study, nevertheless, the relationship between experience and diagnosis was weak, with Odds ratios close to 1. These different findings exemplify the lack of consensus in the literature regarding the relationship between physician experience and diagnostic accuracy.
Our findings have theoretical implications. First, they provide some validation of the HyGene model using a realistic task: Physicians diagnosed and managed the hypothetical patients consistently with the probabilistic nature of this process, sensitive to changes in prevalence and to a more strongly activated, competing diagnosis. These findings are also consistent with other theoretical models, such as the Extended Analytical-Heuristic Processes model (J. S. B. T. Evans, 2006) . Prevalence of cancer likely plays some role in constructing the most plausible mental model of the symptoms; if the mental model of an alternative diagnosis is generated and meets the "satisfaction principle" threshold, then it is likely to be accepted; this, in turn, may eliminate the less likely mental model of cancer. However, these post hoc explanations of our findings cannot corroborate J. S. B. T. Evans's (2006) model, because it does not postulate-in contrast with the HyGene model-these specific predictions a priori.
Furthermore, we did not study an exhaustive list of factors postulated by the HyGene model that could affect the hypotheses generation phase and, in turn, cancer detection. Other cognitive factors, for example, working memory capacity and the number of diagnostic alternatives considered, as well as situational factors that directly impinge on cognition, such as time constraints and order of presented data, are of equal theoretical importance for model validation on practicing physicians and should be included in future studies (e.g., Doherty et al., 1996; Dougherty, Gettys, & Thomas, 1997; Dougherty & Hunter, 2003a , 2003b Thomas et al., 2008 Thomas et al., , 2014 . The two factors that we chose to test in this study are theoretically important for model validation and could be adopted in future interventions to improve cancer detection, as suggested later.
Finally, some physicians generated a cancer diagnosis even when its prevalence was low and an alternative, more common explanation was available. This may indicate concern with less common but more serious diseases. Although we did not measure physicians' perceived probability of cancer diagnosis, there is some evidence that the severity of the diagnostic outcome can influence hypothesis generation and inflate posterior probability judgments (Harris & Corner, 2011; Juanchich, Sirota, & Butler, 2012; Weber et al., 1993) . This could be considered within the This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
HyGene model-perhaps the traces encoding rare but costly diagnoses in episodic memory are activated more easily and with minimal cue input. Our findings have practical implications for medical education and training and the design of diagnostic support. In terms of education and training, if retrieval from episodic memory is crucial for early cancer diagnosis, then simulated experience rather than simple provision of statistical information may lead to better probability calibration (Hertwig et al., 2004) . Appropriate calibration of probability may also be useful in avoiding overdiagnosis and overreferral for cancer. In terms of diagnostic support for hypotheses generation, offering a list of differential diagnoses at the beginning of the consultation, and no other help, was found to increase the final diagnostic accuracy of family physicians in two European countries (Kostopoulou, Lionis, et al., 2015; Kostopoulou, Rosen, et al., 2015) . Specifically, family physicians in the United Kingdom and Greece diagnosed a series of simulated patients online. One group received early diagnostic support in the form of a list of diagnostic suggestions at the start of the consultation, after reading some limited information (a short patient description and the presenting problem) and before collecting further information to test their hypotheses. In both countries, the group that received early diagnostic support was significantly more accurate than the unaided control group (pooled OR ϭ 1.40, 95% confidence interval [1.13, 1.67]). Kostopoulou and colleagues subsequently designed a prototype for a decision support system, based on the principle of early diagnostic support, which they evaluated in a high-fidelity simulation (physicians consulting with actors-as-patients) and found significant improvement in diagnostic accuracy, without an associated increase in the number of investigations (Kostopoulou, Porat, Corrigan, Mahmoud, & Delaney, 2017) . These studies provide evidence that early suggestions of diagnostic alternatives, before the physician engages in information gathering and hypothesis testing, can lead to improvements in diagnostic accuracy.
We acknowledge the tension between missing serious diseases, such as cancers, and overdiagnosis, leading to unnecessary investigations and sometimes treatment. Until there is more and better evidence to inform appropriate risk assessment and until economic analyses are carried out to determine the most appropriate decision thresholds for referrals and investigations, such tensions will persist . Although risk cancer tools such as QCancer (Hippisley-Cox and Coupland, 2013 ) and the Risk Assessment Tool (Hamilton, 2009) , which can calculate patients' cancer risk, are currently available, employing them requires that cancer already be considered as a possibility. In fact, the argument for early support, that is, support to influence a decision being made rather than change a decision already made, has been articulated in relation to other medical decision tasks, such as prescribing (Hayward et al., 2013) .
Our study has several methodological limitations, two of which deserve more attention. First, one could question the external validity of the vignettes used in this study. We believe that the vignettes represented the diagnostic and management decisions well, because we constructed them following the general recommendations for designing externally valid clinical judgment vignettes (e.g., S. C. Evans et al., 2015) . For instance, the vignettes were constructed with the help of family physicians, after reviewing the relevant clinical literature, and included repeated patient presentations, as is common in patients with cancer. Furthermore, a recent multicountry study found that physicians' willingness to investigate possible cancer symptoms in vignettes was associated with national cancer survival rates (Rose et al., 2015) . Nevertheless, future research should corroborate our findings in more realistic conditions, as suggested earlier. Second, one could question to what extent our findings could be generalized to other cancers. Indeed, we simulated only two common and well-known cancers. One would expect qualitatively similar processes to be at play in other cancers and-in light of current findings-an amplified effect of missing early presentations of less common and less known cancers.
In summary, family physicians diagnosed cancer more frequently when the prior probability of cancer in patients presenting with vague symptoms was higher, when they did not encounter an alternative explanation of the symptoms, and when the patient presented repeatedly with worsening symptoms. Physicians' working diagnoses guided their referral decisions. Our findings corroborate some of the assumptions of the HyGene model with practicing physicians, and, along with the other studies discussed, emphasize the importance of the initial diagnostic phase when competing working diagnoses are generated. Future interventions aiming to improve cancer detection could target this phase by offering possible differential diagnoses with severe consequences and/or with underestimated prior probabilities.
